Sadat's shift in direction has been continued by his successor, **Hosni Mubarak** (HOHZ-nee MOO-bahr-uhk). But neither the attempt at genuine revolution led by Nasser nor the move to capitalism and more pro-West positions under his successors has done much to check Egypt's alarming population increases and the corruption of its bloated bureaucracy. Neither path to development has had much effect on the glaring gap between the living conditions of Egypt's rich minority and its impoverished masses. No better gauge of the discontent that is bred by these inequities can be found than the proliferation of Muslim fundamentalist movements. One of these succeeded in assassinating Sadat; others have sustained campaigns aimed at overthrowing the Mubarak regime.

**Figure 38.8** Growing Egyptian resistance to the British occupation of the Suez Canal zone was expressed in this effigy of a British soldier that was strung up on a Cairo street corner in January 1952. The Arabic banner that accompanies the mock hanging reminds Egyptians of the Dinshawai incident, discussed in Chapter 33, and the need to sustain resistance to British domination. Within months of this protest, mass demonstrations and a military coup freed the Egyptian people from both the British occupation and the repressive khedival regime.

## The Indian Alternative: Development for Some of the People

Although the approach to nation-building and economic development followed by the leaders of independent India has shared the Nasserite emphasis on socialism and state intervention, India's experience has differed from Egypt's in several significant ways. To begin with, the Indians have managed to preserve civilian rule throughout the nearly five decades since they won their independence from Great Britain. In fact, in India the military has consistently defended secular democracy against religious extremism and other would-be authoritarian trends. In addition, although India, like Egypt, has been saddled with a crushing burden of overpopulation, it came to independence with a larger industrial and scientific sector, a better communication system and bureaucratic grid, and a larger and more skilled middle class in proportion to its total population than most other emerging nations.

During the first decades of its freedom, India had the good fortune to be governed by leaders such as Jawaharlal Nehru and his allies in the Congress party, who were deeply committed to social reform and economic development as well as the preservation of civil rights and democracy. India's success at the latter has been remarkable. Despite continuous threats of secession by religious and linguistic minorities, as well as poverty, unemployment, and recurring natural disasters, India remains the world's largest functioning democracy. Except for brief periods of rule by coalitions of opposition parties, the Congress party has ruled at the center for most of the independence era. But opposition parties have controlled many state and local governments, and they remain vocal and active in the national parliament. Civil liberties, exemplified by a very outspoken press and free elections, have been upheld to an extent that sets India off from much of the rest of the emerging nations.

Nehru's approach to government and development also differed from Nasser's in his more moderate mix of state and private initiatives. Nehru and his successors pushed state intervention in some sectors but also encouraged foreign investment from countries in both of the rival blocs in the cold war. As a consequence, India has been able to build on its initial advantages in industrial infrastructure and its skilled managerial and labor endowment. Its significant capitalist sector has encouraged ambitious farmers, such as those in the Punjab in the northwest, to invest heavily in the **Green Revolution**—the introduction of improved seed strains, fertilizers, and irrigation as a means of producing higher crop yields. Industrial and agrarian growth has generated the revenue necessary for the Indian government to promote literacy and village development schemes, as well as family planning, village electrification, and other improvement projects in recent decades. Indians have also developed one of the largest and most sophisticated high-tech sectors in the postcolonial world, including its own "silicon valleys" in cities like Bangalore in southern India. From the late 1980s India also provided tens of thousands of computer and Internet experts for advanced industrial societies such as those found in the United States and Europe.

Despite its successes, India has suffered from the same gap between needs and resources that all developing nations have had to face. Whatever the government's intentions—and India has been

hit by corruption and self-serving politicians, like most nations—there have simply not been the resources to raise the living standards of even a majority of its huge population. The middle class has grown, perhaps as rapidly as that of any postcolonial nation. Its presence is striking in the affluent neighborhoods of cities such as Mombai and Delhi and is proclaimed by the Indian film industry, the world's largest, and in many sitcoms and dramas about the lives of Indian-style yuppies. But as many as 50 percent of India's people have gained little from the development plans and economic growth that have occurred since independence.

In part, this is because population growth has offset economic gains. But social reform has been slow in most areas, both rural and urban. Groups such as the wealthy landlords, who supported the nationalist drive for independence, have continued to dominate the great mass of tenants and landless laborers, just as they did in the precolonial and colonial eras. Some development measures, most notably those associated with the Green Revolution, have greatly favored cultivators with the resources to invest in new seeds and fertilizer. They have increased the gap between rich and poor people over much of rural India. Thus, the poor have paid and will continue to pay the price for Indian gradualism.

## Delayed Revolutions: Religious Revivalism and Liberation Movements in Settler Societies

Although societies like Iran and South Africa remained independent or broke free from European colonial control in the post-World War II era, the liberation of the majority of their populations was delayed. Rather, in these instances, different sorts of revolutions than those that had brought decolonization to most of Africa, Asia, and the Middle East were required.

As we saw in Chapter 31, not all African, Middle Eastern or Asian states were conquered and ruled outright by colonizing Western nations in the 19th century. Like Turkey and China, Iran escaped direct colonial domination. But in the late-19th and the first half of the 20th centuries, Iran was reduced to a buffer state between first the British and Russian and later the Soviet and Anglo-American great powers. Partly in response to these external threats, regional strongmen emerged to claim national leadership, such as the self-styled shahs of the Pahlavi dynasty. The second of these shahs in particular, Muhammad Reza, whose throne was rescued by covert interventions by the United States in 1953, ruled the country as an absolutist monarch with a vast secret security force repressing all serious opposition. By the late 1970s, most segments of the population had become dissatisfied with his rule and supportive of the efforts of the Ayatollah Khomeini and his supporters to carry out a religiously-based Shi'a revolution.

In South Africa, a rather different sort of popular resistance had been struggling to overthrow the minority-run apartheid regime through the same post–World War II decades. Locked out of political power and exploited and impoverished economically by the ruling, European-descended Afrikaner settlers, the black African majority and their colored and Indian allies risked prison, torture, and execution in a struggle for social justice and the right to vote and hold office. Their liberation struggle lasted decades longer than the Iranians' overthrow of the shah and arose from rather different forms of oppression. It also led to the establishment of a genuine democracy, which was ultimately denied to the Iranians, who despite periodic elections have been governed by a theocratic regime.

### Iran: Religious Revivalism and the Rejection of the West

Ayatollah Khomeini

No path of development adopted by a postcolonial society has provided more fundamental challenges to the existing world order than revolutionary Iran under the direction of the **Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini** (EYE-uh-TOH-lah Roo-hah-luh ko-MAY-nee). In many respects, the Khomeini revolution of 1979 was a throwback to the religious fervor of such anticolonial resistance movements as that led by the Mahdi of the Sudan in the 1880s. Core motivations for the followers of both movements were provided by the emphasis on religious purification and the rejoining of religion and politics, which leaders such as the Mahdi and Khomeini have seen as central to the Islamic tradition. The call for a return to the kind of society believed to have existed in the past "golden age" of the prophet Muhammad was central to the policies pursued by both the Mahdist and Iranian regimes once they had gained power. Both movements were aimed at toppling Western-backed governments: the Mahdists' the Anglo-Egyptian presence in the Sudan, Khomeini's the autocratic Iranian shah and the Pahlavi dynasty.

Although they came from the Sunni and Shi'a religious traditions, respectively, both the Mahdi and Khomeini claimed to be divinely inspired deliverers. Each promised to rescue the Islamic faithful from imperialist Westerners and from corrupt and heretical leaders within the Muslim world. Both leaders promised their followers magical protection and instant paradise should they fall while waging the holy war against the heretics and infidels. Each leader sought to build a lasting state and social order on the basis of what were believed to be Islamic precedents. Thus, each revivalist movement aimed at defending and restoring what its leaders believed to be the true beliefs, traditions, and institutions of Islamic civilization. The leaders of both movements sought to spread their revolutions to surrounding areas, both Muslim and infidel, and each believed he was setting in motion forces that would eventually sweep the entire globe.

Though proclaimed as an alternative path for development that could be followed by the rest of the emerging nations, Khomeini's revolution owed its initial success in seizing power to a combination of circumstances that was unique to Iran (Map 38.4). Like China, Iran had not been formally colonized by the European powers but rather had been reduced to a sphere of informal influence, divided between Great Britain and Russia. As a result, neither the bureaucratic nor the communication infrastructures that accompanied colonial takeovers were highly developed there. Nor did a substantial Western-educated middle class emerge. Thus, the impetus for "modernization" came suddenly and was imposed from above by the Pahlavi shahs. The initiatives taken by the second shah in particular, which were supported by Iran's considerable oil wealth, wrenched Iran out of the isolation and backwardness in which most of the nation lived until the mid-20th century. The shah had fled Iran in the early 1950s after a staunch nationalist leader named Mohammed Mosaddeq rose to power. But the shah was restored by a CIA-engineered coup in 1953, designed both to counter the growing influence of the Soviet-dominated Iranian communist party and insure Anglo-American control over Iran's vast oil reserves. Once back in power, he tried to impose economic development and social change through government directives. Although advances occurred, the regime managed to alienate the great mass of the Iranian people in the process.

The shah's dictatorial and repressive regime deeply offended the emerging middle classes, whom he considered his strongest potential supporters. His flaunting of Islamic conventions and his neglect of Islamic worship and religious institutions enraged the *ayatollahs,* or religious experts. They also alienated the *mullahs,* or local prayer leaders and mosque attendants, who guided the religious and personal lives of the great majority of the Iranian population. The favoritism the shahs showed foreign investors and a handful of big Iranian entrepreneurs with personal connections to highly placed officials angered the smaller bazaar merchants, who had long maintained close links with the mullahs and other religious leaders. The shah's half-hearted land reform schemes alienated the land-owning classes without doing much to improve the condition of the rural poor. Even the urban workers, who benefited most from the boom in construction and light industrialization the shah's development efforts had stimulated, were dissatisfied. In the years before the 1979 revolution, a fall in oil prices resulted in an economic slump and widespread unemployment in urban areas such as the capital, Tehran.

Although he had treated his officers well, the shah had badly neglected the military rank-and-file, especially in the army. So when the crisis came in 1978, the shah found that few soldiers were prepared to defend his regime. His armies refused to fire on the growing crowds that demonstrated for his removal and the return of Khomeini, then in exile in Paris. Dying of cancer and disheartened by what he saw as betrayal by his people and by allies such as the United States, the shah fled without much of a fight. Khomeini's revolution triumphed over a regime that looked powerful but proved exceptionally vulnerable.

After coming to power, Khomeini, defying the predictions of most Western "experts" on Iranian affairs, followed through on his promises of radical change. Constitutional and leftist parties allied to the revolutionary movement were brutally repressed. Moderate leaders were replaced quickly by radical religious figures who were eager to obey Khomeini's every command. The "satanic" influences of the United States and western Europe were purged. At the same time, Iran also distanced itself from the atheistic communist world. Secular influences in law and government were supplanted by strict Islamic legal codes, which included such punishments as the amputation of limbs for theft and stoning for women caught in adultery. Veiling became obligatory for all women, and

Islam and the State in the Middle East: Ayatollah Khomeini's Vision of Islamic Government

**Figure 38.9** Women played a vital role in the mass demonstrations that toppled the shah of Iran and brought Ayatollah Khomeini to power in 1979. In many ways women's support for political movements in the postcolonial period was a continuation of their active participation in earlier struggles against European colonial domination. But increasingly in the postcolonial era, women have organized not only to promote political change, but to force social and economic reforms intended to improve the quality of their own lives as women.

the career prospects for women of the educated middle classes, who had been among the most favored by the shah's reforms, suddenly were limited drastically (Figure 38.9).

Khomeini's planners also drew up grand schemes for land reform, religious education, and economic development that accorded with the dictates of Islam. Most of these measures came to little because soon after the revolution, Saddam Hussein, the military leader of neighboring Iraq, sought to take advantage of the turmoil in Iran by annexing its western, oil-rich provinces. The Iran-Iraq War that resulted swallowed up Iranian energies and resources for almost the entire decade after Khomeini came to power. The struggle became a highly personal vendetta for Khomeini, who was determined to destroy Saddam Hussein and punish the Iraqis. His refusal to negotiate peace caused heavy losses and untold suffering to the Iranian people. This suffering continued long after it was clear that the Iranians' aging military equipment and handful of allies were no match for Hussein's more advanced military hardware and an Iraqi war machine bankrolled by its oil-rich Arab neighbors, who were fearful that Khomeini's revolution might spread to their own countries.

As the support of the Western powers, including the United States (despite protestations of neutrality), for the Iraqis increased, the position of the isolated Iranians became increasingly intolerable. Hundreds of thousands of poorly armed and half-trained Iranian conscripts, including tens of thousands of untrained and nearly weaponless boys, died before Khomeini finally agreed to a humiliating armistice in 1988. Peace found revolutionary Iran in shambles. Few of its development initiatives had been pursued, and shortages in food, fuel, and the other necessities of life were widespread.

Iran's decade-long absorption in the war and its continuing isolation makes it impossible to assess the potential of the religious revivalist, anti-Western option for other postcolonial nations. What had seemed at first a viable path to independent development had become mired in brutal internal repression and misguided and failed development schemes. By the 1990s, however, although control by Islamic leaders continued, more open elections began to occur in Iran, presenting new alternatives for the future. In the past decade, these trends have been reversed by the increasing hostility of the United States, which has greatly strengthened the hand of the religious hardliners and opened the way for the repression of moderate, pro-democracy forces through election reverses and political repression.

## South Africa: The Apartheid State and Its Demise

South Africa was by no means the only area still under some form of colonial dominance decades after India gained its independence in 1947. Portugal, the oldest and long considered the weakest of the European colonizers, held onto Angola, Mozambique, and its other African possessions until the mid-1970s. Until 1980, Zimbabwe (formerly Southern Rhodesia) was run by white settlers, who had unilaterally declared their independence from Great Britain. Southwest Africa became fully free of South African control only in 1989, and some of the smaller islands in the West Indies and the Pacific remain under European or American rule to the present day.

By the 1970s, however, South Africa was by far the largest, most populous, richest, and most strategic area where most of the population had yet to be liberated from colonial domination. Since the 1940s, the white settlers, particularly the Dutch-descended Afrikaners, had solidified their internal control of the country under the leadership of the Nationalist party. In stages and through a series of elections in which the blacks, who made up the majority of South Africans, were not allowed to vote, the Nationalists won complete independence from Great Britain in 1960. From 1948, when the Nationalist party first came to power, the Afrikaners moved to institutional-

ize white supremacy and white minority rule by passing thousands of laws that, taken together, made up the system of apartheid (see Chapter 35) that dominated all aspects of South African life until the 1990s.

Apartheid was designed not only to ensure a monopoly of political power and economic dominance for the white minority, both British- and Dutch-descended, but also to impose a system of extreme segregation on all races of South Africa in all aspects of their lives. Separate and patently unequal facilities were established for different racial groups for recreation, education, housing, work, and medical care. Dating and sexual intercourse across racial lines were strictly prohibited, skilled and high-paying jobs were reserved for white workers, and nonwhites were required to carry passes that listed the parts of South Africa where they were allowed to work and live. If caught by the police without their passes or in areas where they were not permitted to travel, nonwhite South Africans were routinely given stiff jail sentences.

Spatial separation was also organized on a grander scale by the creation of numerous **homelands** within South Africa, each designated for the main ethnolinguistic or "tribal" groups within the black African population. Though touted by the Afrikaners as the ultimate solution to the racial "problem," the homelands scheme would have left the black African majority with a small portion of some of the poorest land in South Africa. Because the homelands were overpopulated and poverty-stricken, the white minority was guaranteed a ready supply of cheap black labor to work in their factories and mines and on their farms. Denied citizenship in South Africa proper, these laborers would have been forced eventually to return to the homelands, where they had left their wives and children while emigrating in search of work.

To maintain the blatantly racist and inequitable system of apartheid, the white minority had to build a police state and expend a large portion of the federal budget on a sophisticated and well trained military establishment. Because of the land's great mineral wealth, the Afrikaner nationalists were able to find the resources to fund their garrison state for decades. Until the late 1980s, the government prohibited all forms of black protest and brutally repressed even nonviolent resistance. Black organizations such as the **African National Congress** were declared illegal, and African leaders such as **Walter Sisulu** and **Nelson Mandela** were shipped off to maximum-security prisons. Other leaders, such as **Steve Biko,** one of the young organizers of the Black Consciousness movement, were murdered while in police custody.

A Liberal White Journalist on Apartheid

Through spies and police informers, the regime tried to capitalize on personal and ethnic divisions within the black majority community. Favoritism was shown to some leaders and groups to keep them from uniting with others in all-out opposition to apartheid. With all avenues of constitutional negotiation and peaceful protest closed, many advocates of black majority rule in a multiracial society turned to guerrilla resistance from the 1960s onward. The South African government responded in the 1980s by declaring a state of emergency, which simply intensified the restrictions already in place in the garrison state. The government repeatedly justified its repression by labeling virtually all black protest as communist-inspired and playing on the racial fears of the white minority.

Through most of the 1970s and early 1980s, it appeared that the hardening hostility between the unyielding white minority and the frustrated black majority was building to a very violent upheaval. But from the late 1980s, countervailing forces were taking hold in South African society. An international boycott greatly weakened the South African economy. In addition, the South African army's costly and futile involvement in wars in neighboring Namibia and Angola seemed to presage never-ending struggles against black liberation movements within the country. Led by the courageous **F. W. de Klerk,** moderate Afrikaner leaders pushed for reforms that began to dismantle the system of apartheid. The release of key black political prisoners, such as the dramatic freeing of Nelson Mandela in 1990, signaled that at long last the leaders of the white majority were ready to negotiate the future of South African politics and society. Permission for peaceful mass demonstrations and ultimately the enfranchisement of all adult South Africans for the 1994 elections provided a way out of the dead end in which the nation was trapped under apartheid.

The well run and remarkably participatory 1994 elections brought to power the African National Congress party, led by Nelson Mandela, who became the first black president of South Africa. Mandela proved to be one of the most skillful and respected political leaders on the world

**Figure 38.10** This photograph of a long line of newly enfranchised citizens waiting to vote in South Africa provides a striking contrast with the decreasing participation in elections in the United States and other older democracies in the West. For the first time, the Bantu-speaking peoples, coloreds, and Indians who make up the vast majority of South Africa's population were allowed to vote in free elections. Their determination to exercise their hard-won right to vote was demonstrated by the peoples' willingness to wait, often in stifling heat, for many hours in the long lines that stretched from polling stations throughout the country.

scene as well as a moderating force in the potentially volatile South African arena. The peaceful surrender of power by F. W. de Klerk's losing party, which was supported by most of the white minority, suggested that a pluralist democracy might well succeed in South Africa (Figure 38.10). But major obstacles remain. Bitter interethnic rivalries within the black majority community, which periodically flared into bloody battles between Zulus and Xhosas in 1990s, have yet to be fully resolved. Hard-line white supremacist organizations among the Afrikaners continue to defy the new regime. And the tasks of reforming the institutions and redistributing the wealth of South Africa in ways that will make for a just and equitable social order are formidable. Well into the 21st century, South Africa is likely to remain one of the most interesting and promising social experiments of an age in which communalism and ethnic hostility threatened to engulf much of the globe.

## Globalization and Postcolonial Societies

Although many of the areas colonized by the industrialized nations of the West had participated in long-distance trade from early times, colonial rule greatly intensified their integration into the capitalist-dominated world system. Colonization also brought more remote areas that had been only marginally affected by cross-cultural trade into the world system for the first time. As we have seen in Chapter 29 and the present chapter, new market linkages not only affected the elites and trading classes of African, Middle Eastern, and Asian societies, but they also increasingly involved the peasants, who made up the great majority of the population of colonial societies, as well as smaller numbers of workers in the towns and cities.

In the postcolonial era, this process of global market integration has accelerated steadily. One key feature of advancing globalization has been the specialized production of mineral and agricultural exports for foreign consumption. Another has been the growing proportion of uprooted farmers and urban laborers in postcolonial societies employed in factories manufacturing clothing, household furnishings, audiovisual equipment, and other consumer goods for sale overseas, particularly in wealthy societies such as those in North America, western Europe, and Japan. These shifts have greatly increased trading links and economic independence between postcolonial societies and those that had formerly colonized them.

The pervasiveness of these connections in the daily lives of peoples around the globe can be readily seen in the shoes, clothing, and watches worn by the teacher and students in your class, and by the equipment and furnishings of your classrooms. Poll the class to determine where these items and other school supplies were produced. Discuss household and other personal items that were likely to have been manufactured, or at least assembled, in similar locales. Then consider the conditions under which the laborers who made these products were likely to have worked, and the international corporations that oversee and market these products.

**QUESTIONS** Who benefits the most from the profits made in the international marketing of goods from postcolonial societies? How does the fact they are imported in massive quantities affect the wages and working conditions of American factory laborers? What measures can be taken to improve the situation of both workers in emerging nations and those in the United States, or are the interests of the two irreconcilable?

# Global Connections

## Postcolonial Nations in the Cold War World Order

The years of independence for the nations that emerged from the colonial empires in Asia, the Middle East, and Africa have been filled with political and economic crises and social turmoil, and tensions between tradition and change. At the same time, it is important to put the recent history of these areas in a larger perspective. Most of the new nations that emerged from colonialism have been in existence for only a few decades. They came to independence with severe handicaps, many of which were a direct legacy of their colonial experiences. It is also important to remember that developed countries, such as the United States, took decades filled with numerous boundary disputes and outright wars to reach their current size and structure. Nearly a century after the original 13 colonies broke from Great Britain and formed the United States, a civil war, the most costly war in the nation's history, was needed to preserve the union. If one takes into account the artificial nature of the emerging nations, most have held together rather well.

What is true in politics is true of all other aspects of the postcolonial experience of the African, Middle Eastern, and Asian peoples. With much lower populations and far fewer industrial competitors, as well as the capacity to draw on the resources of much of the rest of the world, European and North American nations had to struggle to industrialize and thereby achieve a reasonable standard of living for most of their people. Even with these advantages, the human cost in terms of horrific working conditions and urban squalor was enormous, and we are still paying the high ecological price. African, Middle Eastern, and Asian countries (and, as we saw in Chapter 32, this includes Japan) have had few or none of the West's advantages. Most of the emerging nations have begun the "great ascent" to development burdened by excessive and rapidly increasing populations that overwhelm the limited resources that developing nations often must export to earn the capital to buy food and machines. The emerging nations struggle to establish a place in the world market system that is structured in favor of the established industrial powers.

Despite the cultural dominance of the West, which was one of the great legacies or burdens of the colonial era, Asian, Middle Eastern, and African thinkers and artists have achieved a great deal. If much of this achievement has depended on Western models, one should not be surprised, given the educational backgrounds and personal experiences of the emerging nations' first generations of leaders. The challenge for the coming generations will be to find genuinely African, Middle Eastern, and Asian solutions to the problems that have stunted political and economic development in the postcolonial nations. The solutions arrived at are likely to vary a great deal, given the diversity of the nations and

societies involved. They are also likely to be forged from a combination of Western influences and the ancient and distinguished traditions of civilized life that have been nurtured by African, Middle Eastern, and Asian peoples for millennia.

## Further Readings

Much of the prolific literature on political and economic development in the emerging nations is focused on individual countries, and it is more helpful to know several cases in some depth than to try to master them all. Robert Heilbroner's writings, starting with *The Great Ascent* (1961), still provide the most sensible introduction to challenges to the new states in the early decades of independence. Peter Worsley's *The Third World* (1964) offers a provocative, if somewhat disjointed, supplement to Heilbroner's many works. Though focused mainly on south and southeast Asia, Gunnar Myrdal's *Asian Drama,* 3 vols. (1968), is the best exploration in a single cultural area of the complexities of the challenges to development. A good overview of the history of postindependence south Asia can be found in W. N. Brown, *The United States and India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh* (1984), despite its misleadingly Western-centric title, and Ramachandra Guha's *After Gandhi* (2007). Perhaps the best account of Indian politics is contained in Paul Brass, *The Politics of India Since Independence* (1990), in the *New Cambridge History of India* series. On development policy in India, see Guha and Francine R. Frankel, *India's Political Economy, 1947–1977* (1978).

Ali Mazrui and Michael Tidy, *Nationalism and New States in Africa* (1984), provides a good survey of developments throughout Africa. Also useful are S. A. Akintoye, *Emergent African States* (1976), and H. Bretton, *Power and Politics in Africa* (1973). Frederick Cooper's *Africa Since 1940: The Past of the Present* (2002) traces the struggles for nationhood and development into the first decade of the 21st century. For the Middle East, John Waterbury's *The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat* (1983), and Tim Mitchell's *Rule of Experts* (2002) provide a detailed analyses of the politics of development.

On military coups, see Ruth First, *The Barrel of a Gun* (1971), and S. Decalo, *Coups and Army Rule in Africa* (1976). A fine analysis of the literature on the Iranian revolution is provided in Charles Kurzman's *The Unthinkable Revolution in Iran* (2004). Shaul Bakhash's *The Reign of the Ayatollahs* (1984), and R. K. Ramazani's *Revolutionary Iran* (1988) are among the more insightful of many books that have appeared about Iran since the revolution. Brian Bunting, *The Rise of the South African Reich* (1964), traces the rise of the apartheid regime in great (and polemical) detail, while Gail Gerhart, *Black Power in South Africa* (1978), is one of the better studies devoted to efforts to tear that system down. Nelson Mandela's *Long Walk to Freedom* (1994) is absolutely essential to understanding the latter processes. Among the many fine African, Middle Eastern, and Asian authors whose works are available in English, some of the best include (for Africa) Chinua Achebe, Wole Soyinka, and Ousmene Sembene; (for India) R. K. Narayan and V. S. Naipaul; (for Egypt) Nawal el Saadawi and Naguib Mahfouz; and (for Indonesia) Mochtar Lubis and P. A. Toer. For white perspectives on the South African situation, the fictional works of Nadine Gordimer and J. M. Coetzee are superb.

## On the Web

A timeline for decolonization is provided at http://smccd.net/accounts/helton/decoloni.htm and http://campus.northpark.edu/history/WebChron/World/Decolonization.html. An overview of famed African novelist Chinua Achebe's writing on imperialism and decolonization can be found at http://www.postcolonialweb.org/achebe/achebeov.html and http://www.webster.edu/~barrettb/achebe.htm.

Kwame Nkrumah's classic indictment of neocolonialism can be found at http://www.fhsu.edu/history/virtual/nkrumah.htm, while a classically neoconservative view condemning neocolonialism, but not modernization, is offered at http://www.afbis.com/analysis/neo-colonialism.html. The postcolonial burdens of African leaders are addressed at sites devoted to Léopold Senghor (http://web.uflib.ufl.edu/cm/africana/senghor.htm) and the life and speeches of Tanzania's Julius Nyerere (http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/30/index-fd.html). The life of Nelson Mandela is explored at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/mandela/ and http://www.anc.org.za/people/mandela.html.

Gamal Abdul Nasser's cold war era experiments with Arab socialism as the best means of negotiating modernization are discussed at http://www.arab.net/egypt/et_nasser.htm and http://lexicorient.com/e.o/nasser.htm. The debate over the role of religion as a solution to the moral malaise as well as the disparity of wealth that has come to characterize the postmodern era is illuminated by the works of Hasan al-Banna of the Muslim Brotherhood (http://www.nmhschool.org/tthornton/hasan_al.php and http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hassan_al_Banna) and the life of Iran's Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini (http://www.iranchamber.com/history/rkhomeini/ayatollah_khomeini.php and http://www.asiasource.org/society/khomeini.cfm). For further information regarding Khomeini's role as the supreme leader of the Islamic revolution in Iran, see http://www.bbc.co.uk/persian/revolution/rev_01.shtml and http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1979khom1.html. Possible moderating trends in this seedbed of the Islamic movement are